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THE  CONCEPT  OF  JUSTICE  FROM   
THE  CONTRACTARIAN  PERCPECTIVE 
  
1. Introductory  remarks 
 
The concept of justice occupies a central position 
in the philosophy of law and in political philosophy. 
However, owing to its complexity as well as its sus-
ceptibility to ideologically tainted interpretations, the 
concept is seldom clearly understood. Nevertheless, 
the misunderstandings connected with the concept of 
justice can be at least partly avoided provided one 
makes an appeal to contractarian theories, i.e., the 
theories making use of the idea of the social contract. 
This article’s purpose is to provide an overview of 
contemporary versions of contractarianism. More spe-
cifically, we shall be concerned with the following top-
ics: (1) The place of contractarianism in practical phi-
losophy∗. (2) The differences between the traditional and 
the contemporary contractarianism. (3) Two opposed 
approaches (Kantian and Hobbesian) in the contempo-
rary contractarianism. (4) The proper model of the so-
cial contract. 
In our presentation we shall put a stress on the fun-
damental controversy between the adherents of the 
contractarian approach – namely whether justice is to 
be understood as mutual advantage (the Hobbesian 
approach) or as impartiality (the Kantian approach) 
 
1. The place  of  contractarianism  in  practical 
philosophy 
 
The principal idea of any contractarian theory 
might be stated as follows: an action, a social practice, 
a political institution or a law is permissible provided 
it, or principles upon which it is based, would be 
agreed to by the agents under appropriately deter-
mined conditions**. If the object of agreement are 
principles, then the contractarian theory is indirect, 
otherwise it is direct. Most contemporary contractari-
ans interpret the social contract as a hypothetical one, 
i.e., as the one that would be made under suitable cir-
cumstances, not as an actual one; on the former inter-
pretation, the idea of the social contract is an analyti-
                                     
∗ We use this term in a free manner viz. as embracing 
moral, legal and political philosophy. 
** See Vallentyne 2001, p.3. 
 
cal device to assess human actions, institutions and 
practices. The general idea of contractarianism being 
presented, we can compare it with its main rival 
among ethical metatheories – namely philosophical 
utilitarianism.  
At the outset, it should be noted that every moral 
theory is to fulfill two functions***: (1) to provide an 
account of the foundations of moral reasoning, i.e., to 
answer the question about the subject matter of moral-
ity**** and (2) to offer a plausible theory of human 
motivation to comply with moral rules, i.e., to account 
for the fact that moral considerations are in great 
measure determinative of human actions. How do 
both metatheories solve these problems?  
The adherents of philosophical utilitarianism claim 
that (1) the subject matter of morality are facts about 
individual wellbeing and that (2) our motivation to act 
in accordance with moral rules is a consequence of 
our ability to identify with the good of other people. It 
should be noted that philosophical utilitarianism dif-
fers essentially from normative utilitarianism in that 
while the former is an ethical metatheory, the latter is 
an ethical theory, i.e., a set of moral rules or simply 
one fundamental rule of conduct. As is well known, 
the main demand of normative utilitarianism is that 
people act in a way that maximizes aggregate social 
welfare. It is worth noting that a theory of the social 
contract may serve as a justification of normative 
utilitarianism*****.  
The defenders of the contractarian approach main-
tain that (1) the foundations of moral reasoning are 
determined by the agreement concluded (or which 
would be concluded) by individuals willing to gain 
the benefits of cooperation and that (2) our sense of 
obligation to comply with moral rules can be ac-
counted for by our having agreed to these rules. Of 
                                     
*** See Scanlon 1983, pp. 104-105. 
**** Kymlicka (1998a, p. 226) says that the first task of 
a moral theory is to point at norms that should be ob-
served; as we see, this view differs slightly from that of 
Scanlon who writes that a moral theory should define a 
subject matter of morality. 
***** A good example is Harsanyi’s utilitarian theory 
(see Harsanyi, 1976, 1977). 
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course, (2) applies only to those theories that take the 
social contract to be an actual one. It can, however, be 
reformulated in such a way that it will embrace hypo-
thetical contracts as well. It suffices to assume two 
theses – namely that a given theory of the hypotheti-
cal social contract generates a principle of justice and 
that human beings are concerned with being able to 
justify their actions. Then, it is plausible to argue that 
the morality’s motivational force lies in the fact that 
people desire to be able to justify their actions to other 
parties on grounds that could be reasonably accepted 
by all parties or could not be reasonably rejected by 
these parties. Given the fact that the contract is a hy-
pothetical one, it should be added that the justification 
in question is an ideal one, which means that an agent 
should not be concerned with the fact that some peo-
ple reject the grounds she provides to justify her ac-
tions if only she knows that such a justification does 
exist, i.e., if she knows that were all people to satisfy 
the ideal conditions imposed on the agreement they 
would accept her justification.  
To sum up, it seems that the idea of social contract 
provides plausible grounds for morality: it implies that 
“the justificatory status of moral properties”∗ and 
their motivational appeal are derivative of the idea of 
the rational agreement. 
Now that the general remarks on contractarianism 
and philosophical utilitarianism have been made, we 
can examine more closely the notion of the social con-
tract.  
 
2. Two  types  of  contractarianism∗∗ 
 
The  traditional contractarianism 
It was in the17th and in the18th centuries that the 
social contract became one of the central notions of 
political philosophy. The rationale of having intro-
duced this concept was that the traditional ways of 
justifying citizens’ obedience to the state authority 
based on the ideas of the natural or the divine order 
were no longer acceptable. The concept of the social 
contract gave an alternative justification of citizens’ 
obedience. It implied that having concluded the 
agreement to form the political power, individuals 
assumed a promise to obey it on condition that the 
power respected and protected their natural rights. 
As we see, the traditional versions of contractarianism 
were political, i.e., they were to justify the state’s exis-
tence and to determine citizens’ obligations towards 
the state. The social contract was frequently inter-
                                     
∗ This is Scanlon’s expression (see 1982, p.116). 
∗∗ See Kymlicka 1998a, pp.226-237, Hampton 2002, 
pp. 495-500 and Atger 1906. 
preted as the actual agreement, i.e., as the agreement 
concluded at a historical time by the agents determined 
to leave the state of nature and to found society. 
The traditional interpretation of the social contract 
has been criticized for multiple reasons. As has been 
shown, on this interpretation, the social contract rests 
on the theory of natural rights and duties: the state is 
obliged to protect the citizens’ rights, who – on their 
part – ought to keep their promises to observe the con-
tract resolutions. Considering, however, that the the-
ory of natural rights and natural duties*** is question-
able, one could plausibly argue that the theory of so-
cial contract – the response to the decline of the pre-
Enlightenment ethics – replaced one doubtful type of 
duties (i.e., the divine ones) by the other being equally 
controversial (i.e., the natural duties). Another objec-
tion pressed against the traditional contractarianism 
was that the social contract had never been concluded. 
The consequences of this fact seemed to be especially 
troubling: assuming that without the agreement hav-
ing been made, no authority can be called a legal one, 
it had to be admitted that there are no obligations 
binding the citizens and the government. Conse-
quently, all the governmental institutions were to be 
regarded as deprived of legal validity. One attempted 
to evade these consequences by inventing the concept 
of the hypothetical contract, i.e., the contract that 
would have been concluded by the agents had they 
found themselves in some kind of the state of na-
ture****. On this interpretation, the social contract was 
understood not as a historical explanation of the ori-
gins of a political power, but simply as the manner in 
which one can speak about conditions under which 
the government may have the authority over citizens.. 
However, this approach was found out to be useless as 
a way of justifying political obligations, for the simple 
reason that contracts can be considered as a source of 
obligation only if they were really concluded – as 
Dworkin says: “a hypothetical contract is not simply a 
pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at 
all”*. Therefore, a fictitious contract cannot account 
for real duties. 
                                     
*** The natural duty presupposed by the theory of the 
social contract is the requirement to keep promises. 
**** In fact, the theorists of the social contract (e.g., 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) early understood that the 
contractarian ideas make sense only if one interprets the 
social contract as the hypothetical agreement. It can be 
added that one of the most severe critics of the social 
contract as the actual agreement was Hume. 
 
* Dworkin 1978, p.18. 
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To conclude, the traditional versions of the social 
contract which were to provide a justification of po-
litical obligations are open to three main objections: 
first, if one assumes that that the only justification of 
political obligations towards the state derives from the 
actual contract concluded by citizens, then, given the 
fact that no such contract was in fact made, one has to 
admit that these obligations are groundless; second, 
the social contract interpreted as the hypothetical 
agreement cannot generate obligations; third, the tra-
ditional contractarianism assumes natural rights, 
which themselves need to be justified.  
 
The  contemporary  contractarianism 
 
Contemporarily, the social contract is conceived of 
as a hypothetical agreement being an analytical device 
to highlight the essence of morality** and to assess 
social institution, practices or individual actions. 
Therefore, the contemporary contractarianism tackles 
the problem of grounding personal – moral – duties 
which were taken for granted by the traditional ver-
sion; it is, therefore, to realize in some sense a mo-re 
ambitious task than the one faced by its older coun-
terpart, which was primarily to justify the obedience 
to and the legitimacy of the state. 
Contemporary theorists of the social contract put 
a stress on two elements: first, on the fact that obliga-
tions are conventional, i.e., that they result from a co-
operation of equal human beings; second, on the fact 
that conventional duties in some satisfy human inter-
ests. Therefore, the essence of the social contract in its 
contemporary version consists in determining conven-
tions which advance human interests. What does it, 
however, mean that human beings are equal? How is 
the phrase “advance human interests” to be under-
stood? To answer these questions precisely, we shall 
have to distinguish two main currents of the contem-
porary contractarianism.  
 
3. Justice: impartiality or mutual advantage? 
 
The contemporary theories of the social contract 
can be neatly divided into two groups depending on 
which conception of equality of men they presup-
pose***:  
                                     
** In particular, the essence of justice (it can be noted 
that, e.g., Rawls takes the social contract as a method of 
defining justice, while Scanlon as a method of deter-
mining moral obligations). 
 
*** See Kymlicka 1998a and 1998b,respectively, 
pp.229-231, pp. 145-153, and Hampton 2002, p.495-498. 
(1) the Kantian theories of social contract – justice 
as impartiality: based upon the idea of moral equal-
ity of men.  
(2) the Hobbesian theories social contract – justice 
as mutual advantage: based upon the idea of natural 
equality of men, i.e., the equality of physical and 
psychological forces.  
Each group offers an entirely different view on the 
essence of morality, in particular – on the essence of 
justice. However, before we pass to analyzing these 
differences, we shall first present the assumptions 
both approaches share.  
Both types of contractarianism assume that society 
exists for the mutual benefit of its members. They 
presuppose the idea of the social contract as described 
in the following passage: 
The social contract represents the agreement one 
would have made in an initial state of nature, in order 
to enter civil society. It does not represent the agree-
ment one would now make, within civil society, in 
order to continue in this condition. Nor does it repre-
sent the agreement one would in hindsight have made, 
at the time of entry into civil society, could one have 
known the consequences. One must eliminate from 
considerations all information which could have been 
acquired only subsequently to entry into society, in 
determining what agreement would have been rational 
for one to make in the initial state of nature****.  
The underlying ideology of both versions of the 
social contract is individualistic: society is regarded as 
a conventional entity and as an instrument for realiz-
ing individual ends of its members rather than deter-
mining these ends. The parties to the contract are con-
sidered to be mutually unconcerned, i.e., without 
other-regarding desires. Both versions treat the social 
contract as a hypothetical one. The aim of the social 
contract to determine a principle for cooperative ac-
tion (interpreted as a principle of justice – Rawls, or 
as morality tout court – Gauthier). 
Now we can examine the differences between both 
approaches. 
Ad.1 Kantian theorists of the social contract as-
sume the intrinsic value of each individual, or, as Kant 
put it, each individual’s being ‘an end-in-itself’. (They 
make, therefore, some assumptions concerning moral-
ity prior to using the notion of social contract*). The 
role of the social contract is to ascertain how thus 
characterized people ought to be treated. In this con-
text, the fundamental concept of the social contract 
proves to be that of impartiality which requires that 
                                     
**** Gauthier 1978, p.49. 
* Which reveals a simplifying character of our general 
description of the contemporary contractarianism. 
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each individual has the right to equal treatment (to 
‘equal concern and respect’**). The social contract, 
therefore, epitomizes the basic principle of the impar-
tial judgment which demands that everyone should 
take into account needs of others as of free and equal 
human beings.  
A good illustration of the Kantian approach to the 
idea of the social contract is Scanlon’s contractarian 
definition of a wrong act:  
An act is wrong if its performance under the cir-
cumstances would be disallowed by any system of 
rules for the general regulation of behavior which no 
one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced, general agreement***.  
 Of course, there are very serious differences be-
tween Kant’s original moral theory and the theories 
of, e.g., Scanlon, Rawls or Harsanyi as well as be-
tween the latter theories themselves. Nevertheless, the 
presence in these theories of such notions as moral 
person, generalisability, the right to equal treatment, 
freedom, ethical preferences, overcoming one’s self in-
terest (or to use Kantian terms, one’s empirical motives) 
entitles one to take those otherwise various theories as 
belonging to one group. Some more remarks are needful 
with reference to the Kantian approach.  
It is worth noting that the adherents of the Kantian 
tradition replace the picture of the state of nature as 
‘the war of all against all’ with the situation of equal-
ity in which every party is to take into account the 
interests of the other parties. The state of nature****, 
therefore, represents the equality of human beings as 
persons in the moral sense. Accordingly, the social 
contract leads to accepting some version of the equal-
ity of rights and resources.  
Of course, various principles may fulfill the above 
general conditions of a ‘Kantian’ contractarian theory. 
Therefore, in order that more definite answers to the 
question about ‘the right rules of conduct’ be gained, 
it is necessary to impose some additional conditions 
on the type of agreement to be made and on the crite-
ria of rationality to be used. Now, the most sophisti-
cated tool that may prove helpful while realizing this 
task is the theory of rational choice including game the-
ory and decision theory. As will be shown in the next 
section, it is decision theory that can be particularly use-
ful for Kantian theorists of the social contract. 
As has been mentioned, one of the tasks of each 
moral theory is to provide an account of human moti-
                                     
** See Dworkin 1978, p. 50. 
*** Scanlon 1983, p.110. 
**** Rawls avoids this term speaking instead about the 
original position (see Rawls 1973, pp. 17-22). 
 
vation to act morally. It turns out that the Kantian 
theories run into serious difficulties in the face of this 
task. One of their basic assumptions is that a truly 
moral action ought to be motivated solely by the 
agent’s intellectual understanding of the reasons that 
stand behind moral rules, not by her subjective prefer-
ences. Needless to say, the thesis that understanding 
alone has a motivational force is very controversial.  
Ad.2. The defenders of the Hobbesian approach to 
the idea of the social contract claim that human beings 
have only instrumental value. This claim entails the 
rejection of the crucial notions of Kantian philoso-
phers (e.g., the notion of a man as an ‘end-in-itself) as 
fictions that prevent rational grounding of morality.  
The Hobbesian approach to the social contract 
rests on the supposition that morality can be grounded 
in instrumental rationality, i.e., that can be derived 
from non-moral premises. Therefore, while within the 
Kantian theories morality is constructed from the 
moral premises concerning human reason*****, within 
the Hobbesian theories morality is interpreted as in-
vented to maximize human beings preference satisfac-
tion, or – at best – as inferred from non-moral prem-
ises******.  
The Hobbesian theories assume that the potential 
parties to the contract will reach it provided they re-
frain from the direct pursuit of their self-interest. The 
state in which individuals put no constraints on the 
maximization of their prefernces is the Hobbesian 
‘war of all against all’, or, to use a modern terminol-
ogy, the state in which only suboptimal equilibria can be 
reached – the state that rational individuals will be will-
ing to leave by concluding the social contract.  
As for the philosophical assumptions of the Hob-
besian approach, it should be noted that Hobbesian 
philosophers deny the existence of objective values. 
They claim that all one can reasonably speak about as 
regards morality are subjective preferences of indi-
viduals. Accordingly, they affirm that there is no natu-
ral distinction between good and evil. They concede, 
though, that it may advantageous for the promotion of 
our interests to establish a convention that condemns 
certain deeds (e.g., killing, lying) as evil. In this view, 
therefore, morality is a mode of cooperation which 
should be accepted voluntarily by all rational people, 
since it advances their interests.  
The defenders of this controversial view claim that 
in the world in which there are no objective values 
and natural obligations morality as mutual advantage 
                                     
***** The Kantian theories, as has been mentioned, assume 
some moral notions (e.g., that of moral person etc.). 
****** See Hampton 2001, pp.50-53. 
 
 The  Concept  of  Justice  from  the  Contractarian  Perspective  
282                                                                                              Проблеми філософії права. – 2005. – Том III. – № 1-2. 
is the best thing that we may have, i.e. we have no 
alternative but to content ourselves with the existence 
of a moral code that is the effect of mutually benefi-
cial conventions. The conventions that arise as a result 
of negotiations among parties will reflect the differ-
ences in their bargaining forces (by contrast, Kantian 
philosophers claim that the aim of the social contract 
is to negate the existence of differences as regards the 
bargaining forces of parties). The content of the con-
ventions having arisen in consequence of bargaining 
will correspond with traditional moral norms provided 
that parties have equal bargaining forces, i.e., that they 
are in fact equal; otherwise, i.e., if there is a dispro-
portion in these forces, the outcome is bound to be 
disadvantageous for the weakest individuals, which 
violates our moral intuitions. What’s more, it may be 
plausibly argued that given the fact that each individ-
ual has the right to make use of all resources at her 
disposal, moral norms will emerge only if these indi-
viduals have approximately equal capacities, since 
otherwise ‘stronger’ parties will not be motivated to 
leave the state of nature. Understandably, the notion 
of inalienable rights to which an individual is entitled 
independently of her bargaining force is incompre-
hensible on the ground of the Hobbesian theories. 
As for the motivational function of morality, Hob-
besian philosophers assume that people are motivated 
to undertake moral actions only if these actions satisfy 
some of their desires. Accordingly, they claim that the 
fact that compliance with moral norms accepted by 
the parties to the social contract increases in the log 
run their chance of satisfying their preferences pro-
vides a clear account of human motivation to act mor-
ally.  
As can be easily inferred from the above consid-
erations, the adherents of the Hobbesian approach to 
the idea of the social contract claim that the same cri-
teria of rationality and objectivity should be applied 
both in the sphere of moral reflection and in other 
spheres of human knowledge. Such an assumption 
excludes of course Kantian reflections about moral 
equality of human beings (or about the natural right to 
equal concern and respect) from the area of rational 
discourse. What is at issue is whether we should 
require that morality should satisfy the same crite-
ria of objectivity and rationality as those satisfied 
by ‘more exact’ disciplines. Thus, we see that the 
fundamental philosophical controversy within contrac-
tarian theories boils down to the old controversy be-
tween naturalism (represented, e.g., by Hobbes) and 
anti-naturalism (represented, e.g., by Kant). 
Summing up, within the Hobbesian tradition, the 
notion of morality gains an entirely different meaning 
as compared with a traditional one. What’s more, it 
may be plausibly argued that the Hobbesian theo-
ries of the social contract do not represent an al-
ternative conception of morality, but an alternative 
to morality∗. 
The last question to be answered in this section is 
whether the theories of the social contract really base 
morality on the notion of agreement∗∗. As regards its 
traditional versions, the answer is positive, though 
a reservation must be made that an underlying as-
sumption of these theories is the thesis that there exist 
natural obligations. As regards the contemporary con-
tractarianism, the matter is even more complicated: 
although prima facie the notion of the social contract 
may seem to be of great moment, as it is believed to 
provide the foundation of justice, it may be plausibly 
argued that this notion is no more than an analytical 
device to explicate impartiality and mutual advantage 
which are the real foundations of morality∗∗∗. 
In the next section we will show that the two ap-
proaches to the social contract discussed above can be 
correlated with two different models of the social con-
tract. 
 
4. The  social  contract: an  ideal  in dividual  
decision  or  an  ideal  social  bargain? 
 
One of the sources of controversies connected with 
the notion of the social contract is that it is by no 
means clear what conditions should be imposed on the 
contract as well as on the parties to it; more specifi-
cally, one must decide whether the social contract 
should be modeled as an ideal individual decision 
(IID) or as an ideal collective bargain (ICB)****. As 
will turn out, this distinction, strictly connected with 
the distinction analysed in the previous section, can be 
interpreted as derivative of the amount of information 
available to parties at the moment of entering the so-
cial contract.  
 We shall compare both models of the social con-
tract in the table.  
 
Points of 
diver-
gence 
The social con-
tract as an ideal 
collective bargain 
The social contract 
as an ideal individ-
ual decision 
                                     
∗ See Kymlicka 1998b, p. 151. 
∗∗ See Kymlicka 1998a, p. 236. 
∗∗∗ This thesis is defended by Kymlicka (see ibid., pp. 
236-237). 
**** See Gauthier 1978. A bargain is a situation in 
which two or more agents are able to produce some bene-
fit through cooperating with each other on condition that 
they agree in advance on a division between them (See 
Hargreaves Heap, Varoufakis, 1996, p. 111). 
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1. The par-
ties to the 
contract 
Only those persons 
whose cooperation 
may benefit at least 
some other persons, 
which means, e.g., 
that children and the 
severely disabled 
cannot be parties to 
the contract. 
Each person as a moral 
person is a party to the 
contract. Since all moral 
persons are identical, the 
social contract can be 
thought of as a IID. 
2.The re-
quired level 
of the igno-
rance of the 
parties 
Gauthier: no veil of 
ignorance – the so-cial 
contract is a bargain 
among real persons 
who are ful-ly in-
formed, deter-minate 
and who know their 
utility functions*. 
Rawls: a thick veil of 
ignorance: a decision-
maker lacks the knowl-
edge of her particular 
self; she knows only that 
she has certain abilities, 
certain interests and that 
she uses the former to 
maximize the satisfaction 
of the latter (she has also 
the knowledge of the 
laws of nature and of 
some general features of 
the world) Therefore, the 
decision-maker – a moral 
person – does not know 
her utility function. 
Scanlon: parties have 
full knowledge of their 
particular features, yet 
they cannot make use 
of it – the only motive 
of their actions is the 
desire to reach a ra-
tional agreement. 
3. Notable 
contempo-
rary repre-
sentatives. 
David Gauthier 
(“Morals by Agree-
ment”), James Bu-
chanan (“The Limits 
of Liberty”) 
John Rawls (“A Theory 
of Justice”), John Har-
sanyi (“Rational Be-
havior and  
Bargaining Equilib-
rium in Games and 
Social Situations”), 
Thomas Scanlon  
(“Contractualism and 
Utiltarianism”) 
4. The main 
tool of 
analysis 
Game theory Decision theory 
5.The chosen 
principles of 
justice 
Gauthier: the mini-
max relative con-
cession principle 
Harsanyi: the avera-
geutilitarian principle, 
Rawls: the difference 
(maximin) principle** 
6. The in-
terpretation of 
justice 
Mutual advantage Impartiality***  
                                     
* See Vallentyne., p. 4. 
** Scanlon does not formulate a principle of justice; he 
provides instead what he calls “a contractualist account 
of moral wrongness” (1983, p. 110); its full formulation 
can be found above in the text in the section 3. 
*** Rawls defines justice as fairness. We identify 
fairness with impartiality, though we must admit that it is 
a slightly simplifying assumption, since the notion of 
7. Philoso-
phical back-
ground 
The Hobbesian ap-
proach  
The Kantian (Rawls, 
Scanlon) or the utilitar-
ian (Harsanyi) ap-
proach  
8. The main 
objection 
Incompatibility with 
our moral intuiti-
ons: since parties are 
fully informed about 
their capacities and 
particular situations, 
they can make use of 
it in a bargain, with 
the re-sult that the 
‘stron-ger’ parties 
will ac-quire a 
greater share of the 
benefits than the 
‘weaker’ ones.  
The lack of motiva-
tional force: a real per-
son cannot identify her 
present self with the 
chooser in the hypo-
thetical state of nature, 
since there is no real 
individual in the state 
of nature (as regards 
Harsanyi’s theory) or 
the real individual is 
arbitrarily chosen (‘the 
least advantaged per-
son’ in Rawls’ theory)  
  
Comments on some controversial points. 
Ad.1. The adherents the ICB approach defend 
their claim by pointing out that the rational agreement 
implies each party’s ability to offer benefits to other 
parties. 
Ad.2. The level of ignorance explains why the so-
cial contract can be conceived of as an individual de-
cision: since the parties do not know difference be-
tween them and each of them is equally rational and 
similarly situated, the choice in the state of nature can 
be viewed as made by one person randomly selected 
from the society****. As we see, the social contract can 
be interpreted as IID provided the individuals are re-
garded not as real persons with varied preferences, but 
as moral persons who are identical in respect of their 
right to equal concern and respect. 
Ad.5. Given point 2, it should be understandable 
that if one demonstrates that a randomly selected 
agent chooses a given principle, one may conclude 
that all rational agents would choose the same princi-
ple. The chosen principle constitutes the content of the 
social contract as viewed by the adherents of the IID 
interpretation. 
Harsanyi’s principle differs from classical utilitari-
anism in that while the latter prescribes maximization 
of total happiness (utility), the former prescribes 
maximization of average utility∗. As for Rawls, his 
well known principle is as follows:  
                                                            
fairness contains elements of selfinterest and reciprocity, 
from which the notion of impartiality is free. 
**** See Rawls 1973, p. 139. 
 
∗ To give some flesh to this general statement, let us 
examine more closely Harsanyi’s principle. In the first 
step, a chooser of principle considers each possible 
principle for cooperative action. Next, she calculates the 
expected utility of a given principle’s adoption for each 
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Social an economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of oppor-
tunity∗∗.  
 According to Gauthier, however, neither Harsanyi 
nor Rawls succeeded in providing a standpoint from 
which the principle of justice rational for all parties to 
the social contract might be chosen∗∗∗. Gauthier 
claims that such a standpoint is gained if we interpret 
the social contract as ICB. Gauthier offers a precise 
definition of the social contract thus understood, 
which we shall summarize below∗∗∗∗: 
Let P be the set of all basic institutions and prac-
tices*****. Let N be any set of persons. For any N, 
there will be a proper subset of P, P(N) including all 
sets of basic social institutions and practices which are 
possible for N. P(N) is therefore the set of possible 
bases for societies, for the members of N. For each 
person i in N, there will be a subset of P(N), Ai [P(N)] 
which includes all sets of basic social institutions and 
practices which it would be rational for her to accept 
in order to enter society. The social contract for N, S 
(N), will be the intersection of the sets Ai [P(N)] for 
all i in N. Therefore, it is a set of sets of basic institu-
tions and practices which all members of N could ra-
tionally accept to enter society (of course S(N) may be 
an empty set, which means that social cooperation is 
not mutually advantageous for all members of N). 
By definition, a bargain is rational provided it is 
rational from everyone’s standpoint. Of course, in 
order that the ICB approach to the idea of the social 
contract be successful, there must exist a unique solu-
                                                            
party to the contract. In the third step, she determines the 
average of these expected utilities for each principle (this 
step implies the usage of some interpersonally 
comparable measure of utility). Finally, she selects the 
principle that maximizes the average of the expected 
utilities of the parties. We may remark en passant that it 
is doubtful whether Harsanyi’s procedure is consistent 
with the requirement that in the state of nature, no agent 
can know her utility function. Besides, it is questionable 
whether on can identify the expected utilities of different 
persons with the average expected utility of a chooser; as 
Rawls says, “the average of expected utilities is not, as 
expectations should be, founded on one system of aims” 
(Rawls, 1973, p. 175). See also Harsanyi 1976 and 
Gauthier 1978, p. 51. 
∗∗ Rawls 1973, p. 302. 
∗∗∗ See point 8 (column for IID) of our table.  
∗∗∗∗ See Gauthier 1978, p. 60. 
***** That is, of “those procedures which allocate social 
costs and distribute social benefits” -  ibid., p. 60. 
tion to the bargaining problem. This solution is the 
content of the social contract. Gauthier’s proposal of 
such a solution, i.e., his theory of justice, is the mini-
max relative concession principle. This principle re-
quires that each bargainer should receive the same 
proportion of the difference between her status 
quo****** and the maximum utility compatible with the 
other obtaining their status quo payoffs, and that this 
proportion should be maximal.  
Ad.7. Considering that the IID approach in con-
trast with the ICB is based on the concept of moral 
person, it should be clear that the interpretation of the 
social contract as IID is assumed within the Kantian 
tradition. 
 
5. Final  remarks 
 
It was not our intention in this article to attempt to 
declare either for the Kantian or for the Hobbesian 
approach to the idea of the social contract. All we 
wanted to achieve was to present these approaches in 
a possibly comprehensive way, e.g., by showing their 
correlation with two different models of the social 
contract. We wanted to demonstrate that contractarian 
theories help explicate the notion of justice, i.e., that they 
reveal that justice can be understood either as mutual ad-
vantage or as impartiality. We hope to have demonstrated 
that this most general distinction underlies and determines 
the differences between specific principles of justice pro-
posed by different philosophers.  
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В. Залуски 
 
КОНЦЕПЦИЯ  СПРАВЕДЛИВОСТИ  С  ПОЗИЦИИ  ТЕОРИЙ  
ОБЩЕСТВЕННОГО  ДОГОВОРА 
 
Данная статья посвящена анализу научных подходов Канта и Гоббса к идее общественного дого-
вора и их влиянию на концепцию справедливости. В статье раскрыто взаимоотношение указанных 
подходов с двумя разными моделями общественного договора. Показана роль теорий общественного 
договора в процессе развития понятия справедливости. Автор указал, что относительно теорий обще-
ственного договора справедливость может рассматриваться или как взаимная выгода или как беспри-
страстность.  
 
W. Załuski 
 
THE  CONCEPT  OF  JUSTICE  FROM  THE  CONTRACTARIAN  PERSPECTIVE 
 
The present article is dedicated to the analysis of the Kantian and the Hobbesian approaches to the idea of the 
social contract and their influence on the concept of justice. The correlation of these approaches with two 
different models of the social contract has been shown. The role of the contractarian theories in the process 
of explication of the notion of justice has been demonstrated. The author points out that according to the 
contractarian theories justice can be realized either as the mutual advantage or as the impartiality.
